The first great financial crisis of the 21st century : a retrospective / edited by James R. Barth (Auburn University, USA & Milken Institue, USA), George G. Kaufman (Loyola University Chicago, USA).

Preface; About the Authors; Chapter 1 The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2010: The Sinners and their Sins; 1 Introduction; 2 US Sinners; 2.1 Central bankers (Monetary policy); 2.2 Commercial and investment bankers (Initial and ultimate lenders; 2.3 Credit rating agencies; 2.4 Financial engineers; 2.5 Government (Congress and the administration); 2.6 Investors (Ultimate lenders); 2.7 Mortgage borrowers; 2.8 Mortgage brokers (Salesmen); 2.9 Prudential bank regulators; 3 Conclusion; Appendix; References; Chapter 2 The Costs of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction.

2 A Weak and Stumbling Recovery3 Measuring the Costs of the Financial Crisis; 4 Additional Perspectives on the Costs of the Crisis; 5 Summing Up the Costs; 6 Concluding Comments: Hopefully Never Again; References; Chapter 3 The US Financial Crisis and the Great Recession: Counting the Costs; 1 Introduction; 2 Lost GDP; 3 Depleted Wealth; 4 The Costs of Government Support; 4.1 Data and methodology; 4.2 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 4.3 The National Credit Union Administration; 4.4 The Federal Reserve's programs; 4.5 Treasury programs; 5 Social Costs.

5.1 Unemployment and labor force losses5.2 Bankruptcies and foreclosures; 5.3 Income and wealth inequality; 5.4 Increased poverty; 5.5 Reduced access to health care; 5.6 Lower fertility; 5.7 More education but more student debt; 6 Conclusions; References; Chapter 4 US Housing Policy and the Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction; 2 The Development of Underwriting Standards; 3 The Affordable-Housing Goals and the Decline in Underwriting Standards; 4 The GSEs' Failure to Disclose their Risk-Taking; 5 The Great Housing Bubble, 1997-2007; 6 The Effect of Bank Capital and Accounting Rules.

7 Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Accounting8 The Arrival of Moral Hazard; 9 2008: Growing Weakness Among the Largest Banks; 10 Chaos; References; Chapter 5 Playing for Time: The Fed's Attempt to Manage the Crisis as a Liquidity Problem; 1 Introduction; 2 Causes of the Crisis; 2.1 Innovations in real estate lending, the ABCP market, and their roles in the crisis; 3 The Unfolding of the Crisis; 3.1 Liquidity v. solvency?; 3.2 The liquidity phase; 4 The Fed's Policy Responses; 4.1 Discount window lending (DWL); 4.2 The Term Auction Facility (TAF); 4.3 Central Bank Liquidity Swaps Program (CBLS).

4.4 Single-Tranche Open Market Operations (ST OMO)4.5 Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF); 4.6 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF); 5 Assessing the Effects of Institutional Liquidity Facilities; 6 Market Liquidity: The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF); 7 Which Institutions Received the Largest Amount of Liquidity Assistance?; 7.1 Special benefi ts for special institutions; 8 Policy Concerns Shift From Illiquidity to Insolvency; 8.1 Why the long delay in recognition of solvency problems?; 9 Concluding Comments; References.

Preface; About the Authors; Chapter 1 The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2010: The Sinners and their Sins; 1 Introduction; 2 US Sinners; 2.1 Central bankers (Monetary policy); 2.2 Commercial and investment bankers (Initial and ultimate lenders; 2.3 Credit rating agencies; 2.4 Financial engineers; 2.5 Government (Congress and the administration); 2.6 Investors (Ultimate lenders); 2.7 Mortgage borrowers; 2.8 Mortgage brokers (Salesmen); 2.9 Prudential bank regulators; 3 Conclusion; Appendix; References; Chapter 2 The Costs of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction2 A Weak and Stumbling Recovery3 Measuring the Costs of the Financial Crisis; 4 Additional Perspectives on the Costs of the Crisis; 5 Summing Up the Costs; 6 Concluding Comments: Hopefully Never Again; References; Chapter 3 The US Financial Crisis and the Great Recession: Counting the Costs; 1 Introduction; 2 Lost GDP; 3 Depleted Wealth; 4 The Costs of Government Support; 4.1 Data and methodology; 4.2 The Federal Deposit ...